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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
LOUISE B. TAYLOR, et al, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
VIRGINIA CLARE JOHNSON, 
!Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
CASE 
NO. 10316 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff, for herself and as 
guardian of her minor children, for damages for the wrong-
ful death of her husband and father of the children, who 
\\1as killed while in the process of removing a disabled 
motor vehicle and trailer from the highway when defend-
ant drove a vehicle against the trailer. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
'Dhis matter was originally filed and tried in Juab 
County, and a jury returned a verdict of "no cause of 
action". On appeal to the Supreme Court, Taylor vs. John-
sGn, Case No. 9874, filed June 18, 1964, the Supreme Court 
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remanded the case to the District Court of Juab County 
for a new trial. The first appeal is reported at 15 Utah 2d 
842, 393 P. 2d 382. 
Prior to the time the second trial was had, defendant 
filed a motion for change of venue which was granted by 
the District Court of Juab County, and the second trial 
was held in the District Court of Utah County. At that 
trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs 
and against the defendant for $28,000.00. Judgment on 
the verdict was entered November 10, 1964. 
Defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial. Those 
motions were denied January 6, 1965, by the Honorable 
Marcellus K. Snow of the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, who tried the case in the District Court of Utah 
County. 
REI.IEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiffs and respondents request that the jury 
verdict be upheld and that the trial court be affirmed in 
all particulars. 
~TA.TEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents will not re-state the facts as set out by 
appellant, but will merely add certain material facts which 
respondent feels the appellant inadvertently omitted or 
neglected to set forth. References to the page of the 
transcript of testimony in support of the additional facts 
herein contained will be referred to as "Tr." 
The headlights of the wrecker, when it was in position 
picking up the Milner car and at the time when the defend·· 
ant approached, were on low beam (Tr. 65). In addition 
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to the lights at the scene of the accident mentioned in ap-
peUant's brief, there was a flood light on the wrecker 
' 
the headlights were on on the Milner car, and the head-
lights were on on the Kester car. Also, there were at 
least four flashlights being used at the scene of the acci-
dent. 
As she approached from the South and at a point one--
half mile before she collided, the defendant saw the head-
lights and the oscillating lights on the wrecker, and rec-
ognized it to be a wrecker, and thought there might be an 
accident ahead. At that time, she could not tell whether 
the wrecker was moving or not, nor could she tell where 
it was on the road (Tr. 172, 173). Until she reached a 
point right in front of the wrecker, where she either had 
to hit the same head-on or attempt to go around it, she 
had never applied her brakes (Tr. 173, 178). 
Mrs. Kester had had no difficulty wlhatever when 
other vehicles approached from the South while the wrecker 
was in place prior to the time that the defendant's car 
came on the scene (Tr. 54, 56). The reason Mrs. Kester 
could not get out in front of the wrecker to warn, as she 
had been able to do in other instances, was because the 
defendant was approaching at too great a speed (Tr. 50, 
51, 54). 
Officer Rex Hlill was assisted in making the investi-
gation by officers Sherwood and Ed Pitcher of the Utah 
State Highway Patrol (Tr. 85, 89, and 125). 
During the course of the investigation the investigat-
ing officers made three road tests for the purpose of deter-
mining the coefficient of friction upon the roadway. 'l\vo 
of the tests were made early in the morning (Tr. 80)' and 
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the third test was made in afternoon of ,that day (Tr. 85). 
At the ti~e of the investigation the road was dry (Tr. 64), 
and was m the same condition as it was at the time the 
accident happened (Tr. 83). 
At the time of the impact between the defendant's 
vehicle and the trailer and Kester vehicle, the emergency 
brake was set on the Kester vehicle (Tr. 19, 46). 
The defendant's vehicle laid down 23 feet of skid marks 
on one side, and 16 feet of skid marks on the other side 
leading to the gouge marks (Tr. 7 4) . The distance that 
defendant's vehicle traveled after impact was 56 feet rather 
than 46 feet (Tr. 94). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9, AS GIVEN BY THE COURT, 
WAS IN ALL RESPECTS A PROPER INSTRUCTION 
ON THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
The jury was instructed that it was the duty of the 
defendant to use reasonable care in driving her car to avoid 
danger to herself and others and to observe and be aware 
of the conditions of the highway, the traffic thereon, and 
other existing conditions (Instruction No. 6). Reasonable 
or ordinary care was defined in Instruction No. 5. They 
were further instructed in Instruction No. 7, that a person 
approaching a wrecker in darkness, which wrecker is dis-
playing appropriate lights, and who knows it to be a 
wrecker, is charged with knowledge that the operation 
thereof may necessitate parking in lanes of traffic, travel· 
ing against traffic, and may otherwise interfere with the 
normal flow of traffic. 41-6-140.20, Utah Code Annotated. 
5 
1953. Fwiher that it is the duty of such person to decrease 
his speed or stop if necessary, until it can be determined 
that it is reasonably safe to proceed, and that failure to 
do so may constitute negligence. 
Instruction No. 11 advised the jury that no inference 
of negligence could be drawn from the fact that ·an accident 
had happened and that the mere fact, if it was a fact, that 
it was po~ible for a person to avoid an accident that he did 
not avoid, does not, of itself, justify a finding that he was 
negligent. Also, that if a person used ordinary care and 
did all that an ordinary prudent person would have done 
in the circumstance, he is not chargeable with negligence. 
Further, that the person whose conduct was set up as a 
standard is not the extraordinary cautious individual nor 
the exceptionally skilled one, but a person of reasonable 
and ordinary prudence. 
The jury was instructed that before there could be 
any liability on the part of defendant it must appear from 
the evidence that she was guilty of negligence. Ordinary 
care was again defined and emphasized (lnstTUction No. 
12). They were instructed by No. 13, that the law did not 
require defendant to anticipate or guard against anything 
that could not be reasonably expected and did not require 
her to regulate her conduct with reference to any conduct 
on the part of James W. Taylor not reasonably to be ex-
pected. F1urther, that she was not required to be extra-
ordnarily alert or to foresee all that she could now see by 
looking back; nor was she required to use extraordinary 
caution for the avoidance of the accident that she could 
not have expected under the circumstances. 
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By Instruction No. 14, they were told that the defend-
ant could not be expected to react differently than she did 
after the discovery that the wrecker was still standing on 
her side of the highway. Instruction No. 30 told 1lhe jury 
that they were to consider all of the instructions as a whole 
and not single out any individual point or instruction and 
ignore the others. 
The instructions thus given by the court in this mat-
ter, taken as a whole, properly and fairly presented the 
iss~es as to the defendant's negligence to the jury. If the 
court leaned at all in its instructions it was in the defend-
ant's favor by repeatedly emphasizing that only ordinary 
care was required of the defendant (Instructions Nos. 11, 
12, 13, and 14). 
The question of whether Taylor was guilty of contrib-
utory negligence precluding recovery was also fairly and 
properly submitted to the jury, basically in Instructions 
Nos. 15 and 9. The jury was instructed by Instruction No. 
15, that the heirs of a negligent person could not recover 
against another negligent person, and that this was true 
even where one is more negligent than the other. Also, 
that if the jury found that James W. Taylor was negligent 
and that his negligence proximately contributed to cause 
the accident, plaintiffs could not recover. 
In Instruction No. 9, the jury was told that a wrecker 
operator, in darkness, has the duty to reasonably warn 
approaching traffic of the obstruction on the highway by 
displaying lights, flares or other practical means and that 
if he failed to do so, they could find that he had been guilty 
of negligence. They were also instructed that if the de-
fendant saw the wrecker and knew it to be a wrecker in 
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sufficient time to have reasonably avoided the colli:sion 
' then any negligence of Taylor in failing to display lights, 
flares, or other practical warning devices, would not be a 
contributing proximate cause of his death, and the defense 
of contributory negligence would not defeat plaintiff's re-
covery. 
Under Instruction No. 9, before the jury could elim-
inate the matter of failure to give adequate warning, if any, 
as contributory negligence precluding recovery, it would 
have to find, (a) that the defendant saw the wrecker, (b) 
that she knew it to be a wrecker, and (c) that she saw it 
in sufficient time to have reasonably avoided the collision. 
In context, and in effect, the court simply said in Instruc-
tion No. 9 that if Taylor failed to give a warning it does 
not necessarily preclude plaintiff's recovery from defend-
ant if, in fact, defendant received a warning in some man-
ner in sufficient time to have avoided the collision, how-
ever, and by whom, it may have been given. 
Upon the facts of this case, and taking into consider-
ation all of the instructions heretofore mentioned with ref-
erence to the necessity for finding negligence on the part 
of the defendant which was a proximate cause of Taylor's 
death, we believe that Instruction No. 9 was proper and 
a fair statement of the law. It is axiomatic that the only 
purpose of any warning device or requirement to warn is 
to give notice of a potentially dangerous condition, and if a 
person actually receives a warning and fails to act reason-
ably in accordance therewith, it is difficult to conceive that 
negligent conduct, causing injury, on the part of the per-
son receiving the warning could be excused on the ground 
that the party injured failed to give a warning. Velasquez 
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vs. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P. 2d 989; 
McMurdie vs. Underwood, 9 Utah 2d 400, 346 P. 2d 711. 
The question of whether defendant acted reasonably was 
submitted to the jury in the several instructions heretofore 
mentioned. 
Even if Instruction No. 9 is isolated from the others 
and construed as precluding a finding, by the jury, of con-
tributorry negligence in a manner other than failure to give 
warning, it would still be proper. This is so because, as a 
matter of law, there are no facts in the case except those 
pertaining to warning which could legally constitute con-
tributory negligence precluding recovery. Taylor vs. John-
son, supra. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO ERROR ON TIIE PART OF THE 
TRIAL COURT IN REFUSING TO GIVE REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS PURPORTING TO SUBMIT DEFEND-
ANT'S "TIIEORY" OF THE CASE. 
On brief, appellant raises the question, but fails to 
mention or identify the requests she complains were not 
given. We will have to assume that she is referring to de-
fendant's requests No. 7, No. 8, and No. 9. No exception 
was taken to the refusal to give request No. 10. 
Defendant's requests Nos. 7, 8, and 9 all contain pro-
visions to the effect that the wrecker operator had a duty 
to warn approaching motorists by the use of lights, flares, 
guards or other warning signals. Each of these instruc· 
tiorns also contains material relating to some orther "theory" 
of the case. Request No. 7 refers to the duty orf one who 
places himself in a dangerous position to use reasonable 
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care to watch for the approach of other vehicles on the 
highway. This is, in essence, the same instruction as No. 
30 given in the first trial. It was not a proper instruction 
in this case because it presents a fact situation which is 
not supported by any evidence whatever. Taylor v. Johnson, 
supra. Request No. 8 is to the effect that if the wrecker 
operator had time to place flares or other warning signals 
upon the highwiay and failed to do so, the jury could find 
him negligent. The jury was instructed properly as to 
'l aylor's duty to warn in Instruction No. 9. 
Request No. 9 tells the jury that Taylor could be found 
negligent if he left the wrecker upon the highway for a 
period longer than the reasonable length of time necessary 
to remove the wrecked or damaged vehicle. This is about 
th same instruction as No. 29 given in the previous trial 
Such instruction is improper here because it outlines a fact 
situation which has no support whatever by any evidence. 
Also, it fails to require that the jury find it to be a proxi-
mate cause of the accident. Taylor v. Johnson, supra. 
Inasmuch as each orf the instructions requested by de-
fendant contained propositions or theoretical facts which 
were not supported by any evidence, they were properly 
r2fused by the court. 
POINT III 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10, RELATING TO THE PRE-
SUMPTION OF iDUE CARE, WAS PROPER. 
The instruction contains the same language as is set 
forth in Jury Instruction Forms for Utah, Form No. 16.8 
at page 54. 
Such instruction would be improper only if evidence 
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was adduced which would make a prima facie case that 
the decedent was guilty of contributory negligence which 
proximately caused the accident. Mecham v. Allen, 1 Utah 
2d 79, 262 P. 2d 285. 
Here, again, we encounter defendant's contentions, (a) 
that the wrecker wias left on the highway for an unreason-
able length of time; (b) that decedent placed himself in a 
position of danger between the trailer and the automobile 
to which it was being fixed; and (c) that although Taylor 
had other warning devices in his wrecker, he failed to use 
them. 
With reference to the first contention that he left the 
wrecker on the highway for an unreasonable length of 
time, the only evidence concerning this point is that of 
Mr. and Mrs. Kester, both of whom were at the scene 
throughout all of the difficulty. Their testimony was sub-
stantially as follows: The wrecker operator approached 
from the north and stopped his vehicle off the highway on 
the west side. He came over to the Milner car and trailer 
to look the situation over. Since the rear axle of the Mil-
ner car was broken, he could see that it would have to be 
hoisted and towed from its rear. To accomplish that, the 
trailer would have to be removed. Mr. Kester offered to 
pull the trailer in and it was removed from behind the 
Milner car and placed to the east side of the road where 
Mr. Kester could back his car to it. The trailer hitch had 
to be removed from Milner's car and affixed to that of 
Kester. While the decedent moved his wrecker into posi-
tion, affixed his hoist to the rear of the Milner car and 
got that vehicle ready to be removed, Kester and Milner 
were in the process of attaching the trailer to the Kester 
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car. As Taylor finished lifting the automobile, he was asked 
by Milner if he had a socket wrench that would tighten 
the bolt on the trailer hitch. Taylor secured the wrench 
from the wrecker and was in the process of tightening that 
bolt on 1Jhe trailer hitch when the accident occurred (Tr. 
8 thru 22, and Tr. 38 thru 46). The time that elapsed be-
tween the completion of hoisting the damaged auto and the 
oocurrence of the accident was not over two or three min-
utes at most (Tr. 58). There is no evidence whatever that 
the decedent left the wrecker on the highway for a longer 
period than was actually required to get the automobile 
and trailer in condition to be towed away. Moreover, this 
could not have been a proximate cause of the accident. 
Taylor vs. Johnson, supra. 
With respect to whether decedent placed himself in 
a position of danger and failed to wat.ch for other vehicles 
coming from the south, the only evidence is as follows: De-
cedent was crouched down between the trailer and the 
Kester car fastening the bolt on the trailer hit.oh. His view 
to the rear was blocked by the trailer (Tr. 21). The prob-
lem here is the same as it was with Instructions 28 and 30 
given in the first trial. There is no evidence to support 
or justify appellant's contention in this respect. Taylor vs . 
. Johnson, supra. 
Mr. Taylor did have other warning devices in ms 
truck which he did not use, but the fact remains that ihe 
did display warning lights indicating the presence of the 
wrecker on the roadway, and defendant admitted that she 
saw the warning lights at a time when she was one-half 
mile away and tha:t she recognized it as a wrecker (Tr. 
178) . Additional flares could have served no other put"" 
12 
pose than to warn, which warning defendant already had. 
Velasquez vs. Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra. 
In any event, the question of whether defendant had 
adequate warning was submitted to the jury. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING EVI· 
DENCE AS TO THE "DRAG FACTOR" AT THE SCENE 
OF THE ACCIDENT. 
Highway Patrolman Hill was an eJq>erienced officer, 
having been employed by the Utah Highway Patrol for 
more than 9 years (Tr. 62). The officer had received 
special training in accident investigation, including train· 
ing in determining speed from skid marks and from force 
of impact (Tr. 63). 
Sgt. Sherwood of the Highway Patrol also partici· 
pated in the investigation of the accident. Sgt. Sherwood 
has been on the Highway Patrol for almost 24 years (Tr. 
125). He had had special training in accident investiga· 
tion and reconstruction, including training from North· 
western University (Tr. 125). Borth officers participated 
in the tests to determine the drag factor (Tr. 126). Both 
officers testified that they had investigated many acci· 
dents and had made tests as to braking and stopping dis· 
tances. 
The investigation of this accident lasted all night (Tr. 
80). At the time of the accident the road was dry and in 
good condition (Tr. 64). The officers made three tests 
of the roadway to determine the co--efficient of friction. 
They made the first two right after they got thru at the 
hospital and the third at a later time Tr. 80). To make 
13 
the tests they drove the car down the road at thirty miles 
per hour, violently applied brakes, and measured the skid 
marks made by all four wheels and divided it by four (Tr. 
81). The tests were made at the scene of the accident 
(Tr. 83, 85). The officers had a known speed and a known 
skidding distance, and by relating these two known factors 
to the nomograph the drag factor was ascertained (Tr. 
85, 86). 
As pointed out in the appellant's brief, the Supreme 
Court of Utah has approved the use of a pre-computed 
chart by an experienced officer. Gitrens vs. Lundberg, 3 
Utah 2d 392, 284 P. 2d 1115; Pe~rso.n vs. Nielsen, 9 Utah 
2d 302, 343 P. 2d 731. 
Counsel for defendant examined both officers quite 
extensively on cross-examination, and asked Officer Hill 
whether he had measured the co-efficient of friction on 
the gravel· shoulder east of the hard surface of the high-
way (Tr. 123). Officer Sherwood was cross-examined re-
garding co-efficient of friction on the highway and on the 
shoulder of the road (Tr. 135). Had counsel desired, he 
could easily have drawn from either officer the wheel 
measurements of skid marks laid down by their car during 
the test and thereby have checked their arithmetic for 
possible error. Likewise, counsel could have inquired con-
cerning any possible change in road condition between the 
time of the accident and that of the tests. These were ex-
perienced officers, giving no appearance or manifestation 
of any bias one way or the other, and had there been any 
difference in the road surface they would ·have made it 
known. In his objection at the trial, counsel gave the im-
pression that he was more concerned about the use of the 
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calculator-"! have no objection to him telling what the 
four wheel marks were, the average length and what they 
were, but he said he used a calculator." * * * "But he 
testified all he did was test the length of the brake marks." 
* * * "He used some calculator." (Tr. 82). The calcu-
lator mentioned was the nomograph (Tr. 86). If the road· 
way had been damp or wet when the tests were made, it 
is obvious that the friction of the road would have been 
less than when dry, as it was when the accident occurred, 
and that the result of the lesser co-efficient of friction fac· 
tor would have worked to defendant's benefit. 
The evidence relating to the drag factor was properly 
received by the Court. 
POINT V 
THE OPINION EVIDENCE OF SGT. PITCHER OF 
THE UTAH STATE HIGHWAY PATROL AS TO THE 
SPEBD OF THE JOHNSON VEillCLE WAS PROPERLY 
RECEIVED BY THE COURT. 
Sgt. Pitcher was an expert and was so recognized by 
defendant. After plaintiffs had rested, Pitcher was called 
by defendant as her own witness, and was asked hypotheti· 
cal questons which could be directed only to an expert on 
both her direct and redirect examination (Tr. 162, 167). 
Any complaint in this regard was thereby Waived. 
On the merits, however, it is submitted that the wit· 
ness was an expert. Officer Pitcher had been with the 
Utah State Highway Patrol for 24 years. He was training 
officer for the patrol and director of the police academy 
at Camp Williams. This officer had attended the Traffic 
Institute at Northwest University, the Police Academy of 
the California Highway Patrol, had attended college, where 
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he had studied physics, although he had no degree, and 
had worked closely with prominent professors of physics 
at Utah universities. He was otherwise highly trained and 
skilled through study of books and publications and a great 
amount of personal experience in automobile accident in-
vestigation (Tr. 141, 142, 143). He had had experience 
reconstructing accidents from fooce of impact (Tr. 143). 
He had qualified as an expert in the courts of this state 
on possibly 50 occasions during the years (Tr. 144). More-
over, Sgt. Pitcher had personally assisted the other offi-
cers in the initial investigation of the accident in question 
(Tr. 89). 
The question as to the qualification of a person who is 
tendered as an expert is to be determined preliminarily by 
the trial judge, and the court's decision will not ordinarily 
be reversed on appeal unless it is shown to have been based 
on an error of law or to have been an abuse of judicial 
discretion. 2 Jones on Evidence, paragraph 414, page 780. 
'Dhis Court has said that the ruling of the trial court as 
to >Vhether a witness qualifies as an expert should not be 
disturbed lightly or at all unless it clearly appears that 
he was in error in his judgment on the matter. Webb vs. 
Olin Mathieson Chemical Company, 9 Utah 2d 275, 342 P. 
2d 1094. 
The difference between the hypot:hetical question asked 
Sgt. Pitcher by the defendant on direct examination (Tr. 
162), and that asked by plaintiffs, is that defendant's ques-
tion embraces a fact situation wherein defendant's vehicle 
is assumed to have come to rest within the distance stated, 
without taking into account any collision whatever with 
the trailer and the Kester car (Tr. 164), whereas in the 
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hypothetical question asked by plaintiffs, the fact of a col-
lision with the Plymouth and the trailer was included (Tr. 
145). 
On cross-examination defendant asked Officer Pitcher 
if he used the stated distance of skid for the Johnson ve-
hicle in his calculation and the officer stated that he did. 
Counsel neglected to ask him if that was the only factor 
he took into account in arriving at his formula conclusion 
as to total distance (Tr. 148). The officer explained that 
the so-called nomograph formula could not be applied be-
cause there had been a collision involved here (Tr. 149). 
Plaintiff's hypothetical question embraced the fact that 
there had been a collision (Tr. 145). On cross-examina-
tion defendant simply failed to ask the witness how he 
had weighted his formula to take the collision into account. 
In any event, none of this runs to his qualification as 
an expert, but only to his credibility and the weight which 
should be given to his testimony by the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully contends and urges that there 
was no error whatever on the part of the trial court in 
the rulings or in the instructions complained of by appel-
lant and that the verdict of the jury should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALDRICH, BULLOCK & NELSON 
Clair M. Aldrich 
35 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
